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CONCLUSION
The instant case is significant for several reasons. First, it estab-
lishes a limitation on the application of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine to group activities and campaigns before judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. Secondly, in establishing this limitation, the Court
defines the effect, direct or indirect, of such activities as the key
factor in determining whether such conduct violates the antitrust
laws. And finally, the Court suggests a definitive standard of proof
for determining whether the sham exception of the doctrine applies
when there is a group campaign before adjudicative bodies. The
instant case reaffirms in principle the holdings in Noerr and
Pennington that business competitors can unite in the exercise of
their right of petition, and may do so as long as their primary pur-
pose is the exercise of that right and not the restraint of competition.
At the same time it sounds a warning to groups or associations
contemplating concerted activities before adjudicative bodies.
Daniel M. Darragh
TORTS-IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY-DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IM-
MUNITY-MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT OF 1893-PRE-MARITAL
TORT-SEPARATE PROPERTY-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the doctrine of interspousal immunity, rejecting the ar-
gument that an unliquidated tort claim is separate property within
the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, despite the
fact that the tort was committed prior to coverture.
DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 302 (1973).
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity precludes suit by one
spouse against the other spouse to recover monetary damages for
injuries caused by the actor-spouse's negligence. You may "always
hurt the one you love," but that does not necessarily imply that the
injured party will always find adequate avenues for compensation
within the processes of our judicial system. A recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision, DiGirolamo v. Apanavage,' has reaffirmed
1. 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973).
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and endorsed this time-weathered doctrine. Although this decision
is neither unusual nor complex, it provides an exceedingly ready
vehicle for the exploration of the doctrine and the precepts that have
been used to support it. The following is a study of the historical,
statutory and policy considerations that have been relied upon by
virtually all American jurisdictions to either support or reject the
immunity doctrine.
THE DiGirolamo DECISION
Sarah DiGirolamo was an unmarried minor being transported
with her father in a car driven by her future husband, Anthony R.
Apanavage. Due to the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle by
Mr. Apanavage, a collision occurred which resulted in serious injury
to Miss DiGirolamo. Approximately one year later, she married Mr.
Apanavage, and subsequently filed suit against her husband, seek-
ing damages in excess of $10,000.00, alleging that he had carelessly
and negligently operated his motor vehicle so as to inflict extensive
injuries to the body of the plaintiff.2
The trial court accepted defendant's preliminary objection to the
complaint, noting that this objection was based on the doctrine that
one spouse could not sue the other spouse in an action sounding in
-tort.' The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the actions of the
trial court;4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur and
affirmed.'
The majority, speaking through Justice Eagen, ignored the per-
plexing and controversial issues which encompass this rule, and
reaffirmed the immunity doctrine in Pennsylvania. The court
merely reiterated that an unliquidated tort claim did not fall within
the purview of the phrase separate property as put forth in the
Married Women's Property Act of 1893.6 This Act, in effect, lifted
2. Id. Mr. DiGirolamo also filed suit against his son-in-law. The disposition of this case
in no way affected the outcome of his suit.
3. DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, No. 303 (C.P. Northhampton Co., Oct., 1970).
4. DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 222 Pa. Super. 74, 293 A.2d 96 (1972) (4-3 decision).
5. DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973) (4-3 decision).
6. Act of June 8, 1893, No. 284, § 3, [1893] Pa. Laws 344, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 48, § 111 (1965). Section three reads:
Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly in all respects and in any form
of action and with the same effects and results and consequences as an unmarried
person, but she may not sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a
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the common law immunity in instances where one spouse was suing
the other for the recovery of "separate property," and represents the
results of a complex evolutionary process which intermingled the
decisional and statutory law that has surrounded the immunity
since its inception.
The DiGirolamo court cited Miller v. Miller,7 a case which arose
as a result of a wife suing her husband for abuse to property which
she had contributed to the connubial agreement. This case was
decided shortly after the passage of the Married Women's Property
Act of 1856. s The resolution of the crucial issue of whether the im-
munity doctrine barred the action hinged upon the court's interpre-
tation of this statutory language. The court in Miller concluded
that, "She might have such a property in a bond or promissory note,
as would enable her to maintain an action; but unliquidated dam-
ages are not 'property', either in common parlance or technical lan-
guage.
'9
The rationale used by the court in the Miller case has continued
to prevail over more modem trends as evidenced by the more recent
decisions also cited by the DiGirolamo court in affirming the im-
munity. In Meisel v. Little,0 a case which dealt with a tort resulting
from a husband's negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the court
reiterated that unliquidated damages were not property within the
meaning of the statute under consideration. Furthermore, in Falco
v. Pados," the case which abolished the common law parent-child
proceeding to protect or recover her separate property whensoever he may have de-
serted or separated himself from her without sufficient cause, or may have neglected
or refused to support her, nor may he sue her, except for divorce, or in a proceeding to
protect or recover his separate property whensoever she may have deserted him, or
separated herself from him without sufficient cause, nor may she be arrested or impris-
oned for her torts.
7. 44 Pa. 170 (1863). In that case the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer, and the
supreme court affirmed. The wife-plaintiff had sued for damages caused by the waste and
destruction of real estate that was her property by an antenuptial agreement.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 112 (1965).
Whensoever any husband shall have deserted or separated himself from his wife, or
neglected or refused to support her, or she shall have been divorced from his bed and
board, it shall he lawful for her to protect her reputation by an action for slander or
libel, and she shall also have the right, by action, to recover her separate earnings or
property: Provided, That if her husband he the defendant, the action shall be in the
name of a next friend.
9. 44 Pa. at 171-72.
10. 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962). This case was relied heavily upon by the DiGirolamo




immunity doctrine in Pennsylvania, the court still managed to sal-
vage the interspousal immunity rule by relying on the more explicit
and restrictive statutory law of Pennsylvania.
Using the above decisions as a foundation, the DiGirolamo court
went further in a considered attempt to define the exact parameters
of the separate property phrase. The majority cited Willcox v. Penn-
sylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co.,"2 which defined property as the
right of a person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing. Pro-
ceeding to carry their argument to its logical conclusion, the major-
ity pointed out that an unliquidated tort claim could not be as-
signed, 3 and that hence, since a person could not dispose of this
claim for damages in any manner that he or she wished, it could not
be considered property under Pennsylvania law.
Furthermore, the majority argued that if the phrase separate
property was to be considered synonymous with the definition of
property used by the legislature in the original Act of 1848, which
invested a woman with the legal power to own "[e]very species and
description of property, whether consisting of real, personal or
mixed, which may be owned by or belong to any single woman,"' 4
the "interspousal immunity statute would be meaningless, since
every suit between spouses would be to protect or recover separate
property."'5
Finally, the DiGirolamo majority refused to consider arguments
by plaintiff's counsel that the policy considerations which supported
the immunity have totally broken down. The majority reasoned that
the court should not consider the wisdom of a statutory provision
and that when confronted with a specific legislative enactment, it
11. 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). Both her husband and her daughter filed suit against
Mrs. Falco for damages sustained as a result of her negligent operation of the family car. The
daughter sued for personal injuries. The husband sued for the medical expenses and the loss
of future earning power of his minor daughter.
In our view, the above statutory enactment prevents the plaintiff, Edward Falco, from
recovering damages from his wife in the personal injury action involved, even though
his rights are derivative, and even though payment of the damages awarded him will
come from her liability insurance carrier via attachment execution proceedings.
Id. at 384, 282 A.2d at 357.
12. 357 Pa. 581, 595, 55 A.2d 521, 528 (1947).
13. E.g., Sensenig v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910); Manganiello v.
Lewis, 122 Pa. Super. 435, 186 A. 218 (1936).
14. Act of April 11, 1848, No. 372 § 6, [1848] Pa. Laws 536, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 48, § 64 (1965).
15. 454 Pa. at 562, 312 A.2d at 384.
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should not interpose its views on public policy for those of the legis-
lature.'6 Hence, by deftly combining a respect for the doctrine of
stare decisis, and a submission to the powers of the legislative
branch, the DiGirolamo majority decided to perpetuate in Pennsyl-
vania an often criticized legal concept.'
The DiGirolamo dissenters viewed this case from totally different
perspectives than the majority. Justice Manderino, in a brief but
,novel dissent," argued that the statute under examination in this
case was an unconsititutional violation of the Pennsylvania Decla-
ration of Rights."' Justice Manderino attacked the law from an af-
firmative and negative standpoint by 'emphasizing that the Act was
invalid both in granting anyone immunity from a civil suit and in
depriving any person due course of law. Finally, he concluded a
fortiori that even though the constitution states that every male will
be permitted due course of law, these protections must include every
female as well."
Justice Roberts, who was joined by Justice Nix, wrote a second
dissent.20 Justice Roberts argued that the Act in question does not
restrict the rights of women, but in actuality, affirmatively expands
their right to seek a redress of wrongs perpetrated against them. The
court, he contended, has consistently interpreted this Act incor-
rectly throughout the years of its long and troubled life. To support
his rationale, he pointed to the language of the Act of 1887.21 He
16. Id. at 563, 312 A.2d at 385.
17. "The statute in this case which deprives a married woman of her right to file a legal
claim is unconstitutional." Id. at 574, 312 A.2d at 385.
18. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
19. 454 Pa. at 575, 312 A.2d at 385. "The full protections of the Declaration of Rights are
available to females as well as males."
20. "The Court today, in the name of fidelity to legislative intent, permits perpetuation
of a judicially created immunity." Id. at 563, 312 A.2d at 385.
21. Act of June 3, 1887, No. 224, § 2, [1887] Pa. Laws 332 (repealed 1893) [hereinafter
referred to as the Act of 1887].
A married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering herself liable upon
any contract relating to any trade or business in which she may engage, or for necessar-
ies, and for the use, enjoyment and improvement of her separate estate, and for suing
and being sued, either upon such contracts or for torts done to or committed by her,
in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her
as plaintiff, or defendant, or be made a party to any action, suit or legal proceeding of
any kind brought by or against her individual right; and any debt, damages or costs
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argued that this language conclusively states that any debt, dam-
ages or costs recovered by a woman in any legal action will be her
separate property. In effect, he felt that despite a subsequent repeal
of this act, it firmly established that an unliquidated tort claim is
a person's separate property, and that only property held by the
entireties, or by a joint tenancy, would be subject to the proscrip-
tions of the Act of 1893, and its subsequent amendments."2
Justice Roberts further criticized the majority's failure to recog-
nize and confront the policy considerations that have been em-
ployed for over a century to support the precepts of the immunity
doctrine. Relying upon instances where the erosion of policy justifi-
cations has compelled the court to abolish other unjust and irra-
tional immunities,2 Justice Roberts argued that the policies which
motivated the English common law courts to bar such suits have
long been-discredited, and that our court's recognition of this fact
has been long overdue. 4
Justice Roberts concluded with a discussion of the possible un-
constitutionality of this Act. He emphasized that the courts have a
duty to interpret a statute to preserve its constitutionality, and that
this obligation could be fulfilled in the instant case by a proper
construction of the words separate property. He felt that if in no
other case, this should be done when the tort is committed prior to
coverture.
2 5
The decision rendered by the DiGirolamo court is probably more
noteworthy for what it failed to say than for what it actually said.
The majority opinion was neither extensive nor innovative. Its reli-
recovered by her in any such action, suit or proceeding shall be her separate property,
and any debt, damages or costs recovered against her in any such action, suit or other
proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise ....
22. It is true that the 1887 Act was repealed by a later statute, the Act of June 8,
1893. However, the existence of the 1887 Act demonstrates that a married woman's
unliquidated tort claim is her separate property. No subsequent statute declares
otherwise.
454 Pa. at 565-66, 312 A.2d at 386-87 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
23. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (governmental
immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (parental immunity); Flagiello
v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (charitable immunity).
24. 454 Pa. at 571-72, 312 A.2d at 389. Such policy arguments dealt with the fictional
unity of the spouses, the fear of collusive claims and the threat of familial disharmony.
25. Id. at 572-73, 312 A.2d at 391. Certainly the statute vihich permits at least some
actions between the spouses speaks against their conceptualistic unity, and furthermore, the
fact that the plaintiff and defendant in this case were married subsequent to the tort's
commission argues against the familial disharmony theories.
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ance on the traditional statutory interpretation of the law was pre-
dictable; its failure to recognize and confront the historical and
policy issues surrounding this rule was reprehensible. In an effort to
more fully comprehend the scope and impact of this decision, this
comment will explore the historical, statutory and policy rationales
which have supported the immunity doctrine, and the criticisms of
courts and writers in response to each.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The immunity rule was originally founded on an accepted social
and economic basis. In English common law, the marriage was
viewed as a conceptualistic unity." Furthermore, a wife could nei-
ther sue nor be sued unless such actions were conducted in the name
of the husband. This unity of the right-duty relationship in one
person permitted no cause of action to arise substantively, and pro-
cedurally rendered the husband both plaintiff and defendantY
In Pennsylvania, as in most jurisdictions, the courts eagerly ac-
cepted the unity rationale to preclude interspousal suits, 8 even if
the parties had separated or been divorced.2 9 Moreover, many of the
vestiges of this antiquated argument are still considered tenable by
some of the judges deciding contemporary law in Pennsylvania.,
As long-lived as this theory has been, it may well be succumbing
to the more contemporary and logical arguments that are being
advanced against it. Since the passage of the Married Women's
Property Acts was intended to alleviate the common law restrictions
placed on a woman's right to sue, some commentators suggest that
this conceptualistic unity theory has been summarily destroyed.',
The viability, then, of the immunity doctrine depends upon how
26. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (2d ed. 1955).
27. See, e.g., McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv.
1030, 1057 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863). "To every action there must be parties,
and as they are both treated as one, a man might as well be permitted to sue himself." Id.
29. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Wakefield, 149 Pa. Super. 9, 12, 25 A.2d 841, 843 (1942).
30. See, e.g., Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962).
At common law neither a husband nor wife could sue the other for injuries due to torts
committed before or during the marriage. This was based on the legal premise that a
husband and wife are one person, one entity.
Id. at 548, 180 A.2d at 773.
31. See, e.g., Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FoRUM 82 (1972).
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strictly such statutes are construed." A construction of the statute
favoring the doctrine, however, need not depend upon the unity
theory. Indeed, when one considers that the DiGirolamo court did
not even mention the historical background of the immunity, it
could be argued that such a basis is no longer recognized in the
Pennsylvania courts.
In order to fully evaluate the problems of statutory construction
and the areas of the law that provoke the most debate over legisla-
tive intent, a brief discussion of the evolution of the Pennsylvania
Married Women's Property Acts would be instructive.
Pennsylvania's original Married Women's Property Act was
passed in 1848, 33 but the first version to actually be tested and
questioned was the Act of 185 6 .U This Act was interpreted in the
previously mentioned Miller case in which the court concluded that
unliquidated damages were not separate property within the mean-
ing of the statute.35
In 1887, the legislature passed a similar but more liberal version
of this Act, eliminating the prerequisites of either separation or
divorce of the spouses before such an action could be commenced. 3
The Act further stated that "any debt, damages or costs recovered
by her in any such action, suit or proceeding shall be her separate
property. . . . ,,31 This Act was promptly interpreted to grant a
spouse the right to sue the other spouse for any possession which
could be considered his or her separate property-"
Finally, the Act of 1887 was repealed by the legislative enactment
of 1893,'3 which proved to be the final major expression of legislative
32. See, e.g., McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VIL. L. REv. 303, 336
(1959).
33. Act of April 11, 1848, No. 372, § 6, [1848] Pa. Laws 536, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 48, § 64 (1965).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 112 (1965).
35. Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863).
36. Act of June 3, 1887, No. 224, § 2, [1887] Pa. Laws 332 (repealed 1893).
37. Id.
38. Walker v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 168, 45 A. 657 (1900).
The right of the wife in the first action being for a tort done to her, was her separate
property by the express words of the Act of June 3, 1887, . . . and the husband could
not have controlled or interfered with the conduct of the suit or appealed from the
result.
Id. at 173, 45 A. at 658.
39. Act of June 8, 1893, No. 284, § 6, [18931 Pa. Laws 344, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 48, § 111 (1965).
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intent in this strained area of the law. This Act restored the provi-
sions of the Act of 1856 which mandated either separation or divorce
of the spouses prior to the institution of such an action.0 This stat-
ute further limited such suits to actions to recover separate property
only, and has remained in this form up to the time of this writing."
This development of statutory law in Pennsylvania resulted in
predictable interpretational law in our courts which held that the
statutes proscribed interspousal tort litigation, and that the courts
were bound by the express legislative intent.42 As did most other
jurisdictions, Pennsylvania rejected all historical and policy argu-
ments in favor of rejecting the immunity. 3 The DiGirolamo decision
continued in this vein by rejecting the minority view which adopts
a liberal construction of these statutes based on modern judicial
trends and adroit statutory construction." Instead, the decision
adopted the majority view's reliance upon deference to the legisla-
ture and the doctrine of stare decisis to uphold the immunity. It has
been the inconsistency 5 and traditionalism4" of this latter view
which has evoked vehement criticism by legal writers and judges.
The crux of the issue in Pennsylvania and elsewhere has been the
interpretation of the phrase separate property. The DiGirolamo
court's interpretation of this phrase has merely capped a long line
of Pennsylvania cases which have expressed the same holding.,7 The
40. These requirements were again later struck by amendment in 1913. Act of March 27,
1913, No. 18, -§ 3, [1913] Pa. Laws 14 (corresponds to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1965)).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1965).
Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly, in all respects, and in any
form of action, and with the same effect and results and consequences, as an unmarried
person; but she may not sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a
proceeding to protect or recover her separate property; nor may he sue her, except in
a proceeding to protect or recover his separate property; nor may she be arrested or
imprisoned. for her torts.
42. Ellis v. Brenninger, 71 Pa. D. & C. 583, 586 (C.P. Montg. Co. 1950).
43. See, e.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa.
546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962); Chromy v. Chromy, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 791 (C.P. Fayette Co. 1957);
Shoyer v. Shoyer, 36 Pa. D. & C. 673 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1939).
44. See 27 OHIO ST. L. REv. 550, 553 (1966).
45. See 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 590, 594 (1970). "In examining both the majority and minority
courts' construction of these statutes in their most favorable light, the position taken by the
minority courts is undoubtedly more consistent."
46. See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 483, 267 A.2d 481, 483 (1970). "Thus, we held that
the common law immunity doctrine was not rigidly incorporated into our statutory law
47. Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962); Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863);
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strength of such rulings has come from an early decision which held
that separate property refers to property owned by one spouse which
can be carried away or destroyed, not to the unliquidated damages
of a tort claim.4" Pennsylvania has also relied on the status (i.e.,
married or unmarried) of the parties at the time of the commence-
ment of the suit, not at the time when the tort was committed. 9
Furthermore, whether suit is brought in equity or at law will prob-
ably have no effect on its disposition.-"
Pennsylvania's limitation of separate property to property in the
physical or constructive possession of a person and consequent ex-
clusion of unliquidated tort claims from the definition is not without
historical support.5 1 Other courts, however, have rejected these dis-
tinctions, and have interpreted separate property to include unli-
quidated tort claims. 2 A California court has held that a cause of
action in tort is property, and must be considered the separate
property of the injured spouse where the cause of action arises prior
to coverture. 3 Moreover, it has been held that a change of status
between the parties (i.e., marriage) does not affect the nature of the
Chromy v. Chromy, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 791 (C.P. Fayette Co. 1957); Gulian v. Gulian, 7 Pa.
D. & C.2d 247 (C.P. Montg. Co. 1954); Algard v. Algard, 39 Pa. D. & C. 486 (C.P. Lanc. Co.
1940).
48. Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863).
49. Chromy v. Chromy, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 791, 792 (C.P. Fayette Co. 1957).
50. Algard v. Algard, 39 Pa. D. & C. 486 (C.P. Lanc. Co. 1940).
However, the phrase "her separate property", as used in the Acts referred to, does not
include unliquidated damages for a tort committed by the husband against his wife.
This is applicable equally to an action at law and to a proceeding in equity.
Id. at 488.
51. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *436, *439.
But, however, though strictly speaking, the primary right to a satisfaction for injuries
is given by the law of nature, and the suit is only the means of ascertaining and
recovering that satisfaction; yet, as the legal proceedings are the only visible means of
this acquisition of property, we may fairly enough rank such damages, or satisfaction
assessed, under the head of property acquired by suit and judgement at law.
Id. at *438.
52. See, e.g., Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). The state supreme court
overruled the interspousal immunity doctrine in Missouri in all cases.
53. Carver v. Ferguson, 115 Cal. App. 2d 641, 254 P.2d 44 (1953).
Because of the separate nature of any recovery appellant might receive upon her cause
of action, the entire transaction must be regarded as one by the wife to recover her
separate property, as to which no disability to litigate can be asserted according to the
fortuitous circumstances of whether the defendent happens to be her husband instead
of a third party.
Id. at 643, 254 P.2d at 46.
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property owned by each prior to coverture.4 Finally, one court has
held, in permitting an interspousal suit, that the determinative fac-
tor was that the suit was brought in a court of chancery.55
Legal commentators have also joined in the statutory construc-
tion argument. In fact, it has been advanced at least since the turn
of the century that a cause of action in tort is a type of property
owned by the injured party.5" More recently, writers have stated
that if the statute is in any way ambiguous, or if it can be circum-
vented by adroit interpretation, the personal interests of the dam-
aged spouse in having an injury to property redressed should be
afforded the same protection as is afforded others.57
In short, for those courts that wish to abolish the immunity there
are ample precedents and arguments that can be used to construe
a statute for that purpose. However, for those that must deal with
over a century of entrenched law in order to achieve this purpose,
reversal is unlikely. 8 Such a court's willingness to abolish the doc-
trine will turn on its acceptance of policy arguments raised against
the immunity and its boldness in ignoring decades of decisional law
upholding it.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As previously mentioned, the DiGirolamo majority refused to con-
54. O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964).
The character of the property owned by the appellee must be determined by its status
at the time of acquisition; hence, any subsequent change in the appellee's marital
situation could have no effect upon the separate nature of the property which she
owned prior to marriage and which followed her into the marriage.
Id. at 652, 396 P.2d at 289.
55. Juaire v. Juaire, 128 Vt. 149, 259 A.2d 786 (1969). In upholding the immunity, the
Vermont Supreme Court said: "The crucial and distinguishing difference . . . is that . . .
tle plaintiff's action against her husband was in a court of law while in the case before us
the action was brought in a Court of Chancery." Id. at 151, 259 A.2d at 787.
56. See Comment, Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?, 10 L.Q. REv. 143 (1894).
A man's rights of action for injuries to his property must therefore be necessarily
included in his property, notwithstanding that the amount of the recompense to which
he is entitled remains uncertain till a verdict be obtained.
Id. at 146.
57. See, e.g., McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VUL. L. REv. 303, 337
(1959).
58. 27 OHIo ST. L. REv. 550, 552 (1966). "Nearly all state courts of last resort now have
decided this issue on first impression, and it is apparent that courts having once refused to
remove the immunity generally are unwilling to reverse their position."
Vol. 13: 156
1974 Recent Decisions
front the policy arguments which have surrounded this debate since
its inception. These issues, however, must be explored if one is to
understand the total complexity of this doctrine. In those opinions
in Pennsylvania which have not relied solely upon statutory con-
struction, these policy considerations have been used to uphold the
immunity doctrine.5" Furthermore, Pennsylvania has used these
policy considerations affirmatively in rejecting defenses of non-
spousal parties to civil suits by stating that such policy was not
applicable to suits against them. 60 Clearly then, Pennsylvania
courts have recognized, at least in a perfunctory sense, that these
policy arguments exist, even though they have not been the deter-
mining factors in most interspousal decisions.
One such policy argument is based on the premise that domestic
peace and marital felicity might be damaged by an interspousal
civil suit."' While this argument has been widely criticized, 2 criti-
cism in Pennsylvania has been limited to dissenting opinions . 3
Elsewhere, it has been held that the desire to sue is equally as
damaging to marital peace as the actual suit." Furthermore, it has
been pointed out that permitted divorce and criminal actions cause
at least, if not more, disharmony in the home."
59. See Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523, 207 A.2d 412 (1964).
60. Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958)
(administrator of estate); Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 A. 792 (1935) (original defen-
dant); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1944) (employer).
61. Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania-A Concept in Evolution, 69
DICK. L. REv. 143, 144 (1965). "By far the most important bf these policy considerations is
that policy which seeks to preserve domestic peace, harmony and marital happiness by
prohibiting interspousal litigation."
62. See, e.g., Lambert, Seeing the '70's-Anticipations in Automobile Law in the '70's,
34 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 60 (1972).
63. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 385, 282 A.2d 351, 358 (1971) (Roberts, J., concurring &
dissenting); Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523, 537, 207 A.2d 412, 418 (1964) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550, 180 A.2d 772, 774 (1962) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting),
64. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955). "And if the domestic tran-
quility is to be disturbed, such is accomplished by the desire to recover as fully as by recov-
ery."
65. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The Supreme Court of
Washington abolished the immunity doctrine by stating in part:
To these reflections we add the observation that limiting the injured party to a divorce
or criminal action against his or her tort-feasor spouse is quite inconsistent with any
policy of preserving domestic tranquility. Thus, the argument based on suggested legal
alternatives simply does not withstand analysis.
Id. at 189, 500 P.2d at 775.
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Recently, the effect of the presence of insurance has become a
significant factor. Some courts have concluded that where the suit
results in compensation to the injured spouse by an insurer, family
harmony is promoted rather than disturbed.6" Some courts, how-
ever, have refused to follow such an approach. Notwithstanding
criticism that their position is inconsistent with the marital-
disruption theory, these courts base their refusal on a fear of collu-
sion between the spouses against the insurer." This concern over
potential collusive fraud between spouses has found much support
as a contemporary theory to endorse immunity." The fear is that as
a result of the ready and almost universal ownership of liability
insurance, one spouse will bring an action where no injury has been
incurred for the express purpose of collecting fraudulent monetary
damages. In Pennsylvania, the argument has been stated as:
The public policy of this state precludes the institution of
this type of intrafamily litigation. It is a sound policy and one
to which we should strictly adhere, particularly in a situation
where so much opportunity would exist for collusive action
between members of a family if the rule were otherwise."
In any case, in dealing with such an argument, the extensive
insurance coverage of today's society must be recognized." One
commentator has pointed out that if such suits were to become
commonplace and the insurance companies paid the price, the
losses would eventually be spread over the general populace.' How-
ever, it is argued that to do otherwise is to deny a person the right
to protect his loved ones, while permitting him to protect the rest
of the world against injury. 2 It has been pointed out that collusion
66. See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970).
67. See Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in American
Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 317 (1967).
68. Such considerations, added to the common availability of liability insurance,
engendered a new rationale for retaining the immunity rule in negligence cases: the
prevention of collusive suits brought by the spouses to the disadvantage of insurance
companies.
Id. at 317.
69. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 303, 135 A.2d 65, 73 (1957).
70. 6 IND. L. Rm. 558, 565 (1973). "That the availability of insurance coverage may well
be determinative of whether one spouse will bring suit against the other,, cannot be denied."
71. 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 167, 174 (1972).
72. Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550, 180 A.2d 772, 774 (1962) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
I believe that there is really something against public policy in a doctrine which holds
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is not likely since insurance does not create the liability, but merely
provides protection if that liability is established. 3 Further, it has
been held by some judges that the courts have always had to ferret
out unmeritorious and fraudulent claims, 4 and to hold that such
unwarranted claims could not be recognized in a like manner in
these cases, would be an unfair criticism of the judge-jury system. '5
Hence, the debate over this area of the law is still in full force. A
determination of its impact on the age-old immunity question must
await further development.
Other arguments of lesser importance have also developed to pro-
tect the immunity. As these considerations have not been viewed as
determinative in and of themselves, debate has been less strenuous.
Nevertheless they remain of some importance. One such considera-
tion is the established judicial doctrine of stare decisis. Despite the
heavy reliance of the Pennsylvania courts on statutory law, it is still
recognized that past decisional law is one reason for the continua-
tion of the immunity doctrine." Courts generally prefer to leave the
decision to overrule a century of case law to the legislative branch."
However, it should be noted that Pennsylvania has annulled other
immunities by emphasizing that stare decisis is not a confining
doctrine, and that a judicial body is compelled to overrule that
which is antiquated, unfair and irrational." Hence, it is not likely
that stare decisis will be determinative of the permissibility of
interspousal suits in the future.
that the head of a family may protect the whole world against his negligence except
those he loves most and are wholly dependent upon him for maintenance and subsist-
ence.
Id. at 565, 180 A.2d at 781.
73. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 ViL. L. REv. 303, 330 (1959). "If
there is no legal liability on the part of the insured, the policy does not cover. It covers
liability, does not create it."
74. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 494, 267 A.2d 481, 487 (1970).
75. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 190, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
76. See Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 548, 180 A.2d 772, 773 (1962).
77. See 27 OHio ST. L. Rsw. 550 (1966).
78. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolished
longstanding tort immunity of local governmental units such as school boards, municipal
corporations and quasi-corporations on grounds that public policy demanded judicial termi-
nation of this antiquated doctrine); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (parental
immunity abolished on grounds that it no longer had rational support or purpose); Flagiello
v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (charitable immunity abolished on
grounds that where a policy has become totally inconsistent with notions of natural justice
the courts must act to remove that policy).
1974
Duquesne Law Review
Another recurring argument for perpetuating the immunity is
that other remedies are available to a spouse through divorce and
criminal proceedings. 7 In response to this, it has been argued that
such a viewpoint defeats the concern over marital unity.10 Yet, this
policy continues to exist because of judicial reliance on the language
of the acts under consideration.
A final policy argument used by the supporters of the immunity
is that abolition of the doctrine would result in a flood of unmerito-
rious, fraudulent and absurd claims.8 It would seem, however, that
the better view would be to wait to see if such a flood develops before
denying meritorious claimants an avenue for the redress of their
injuries. Furthermore, courts have always faced the task of ferreting
out fraudulent claims, and these cases should be handled no differ-
ently .82
Novel and compelling arguments are continually being developed
by those who are in opposition to the rule. The DiGirolamo dissen-
ters put forth one of these novel viewpoints in arguing that the
Married Women's Property Acts are unconstitutional to the extent
that they provide one spouse with immunity from suit and deny the
other due process of law. Furthermore, it has been argued that
such statutes violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth.
amendment to the United States Constitution.'" It is asserted that
even if it could be ascertained that the state's interest in preserving
marital harmony or preventing fraudulent collusion is a compelling
one, the immunity would fall as not being reasonably related to that
purpose. 85
79. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relatibns, 43 HMv. L. REv. 1030
(1930).
80. Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 553, 180 A.2d 772, 775 (1962) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
"The law permits the wife to prosecute her husband criminally in such a situation. Does that
kind of procedure, which may end in the husband's incarceration, promote family unity?"
81. Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania-A Concept in Evolution, 69
DICK. L. REv. 143, 144 (1965). "Removal of the immunity, it is argued, would lift the flood
gates on collusive and fraudulent claims."
82. See Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 190, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972).
83. 454 Pa. at 574, 312 A.2d at 385.
84. Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity: An Analysis of the Law in Washington and
Oregon, 8 WinLAMErr L.J. 427, 445-46 (1972). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states:
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immun-
ities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
85. See Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity: An Analysis of the Law in Washington
and Oregon, 8 WILLtME'r L.J. 427, 444-46 (1972).
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Another line of argument posits that immunity defeats "fairness"
and "justice." 6 In a case which abolished the Pennsylvania govern-
mental immunity rule, it was held that it was part of our judicial
system to allow recovery for every substantial wrong. 7 Some have
pointed to the inconsistency of allowing a spouse to argue inten-
tional misconduct and malice in a breach of contract action, while
denying a similar opportunity to allege mere carelessness in a negli-
gence action, on the grounds, of threat to marital harmony.8 Fur-
thermore, Pennsylvania, relying on recent tort law developments,
abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity by holding that
liability follows the tortious conduct wherever it may lead., More-
over, it was held that the compelling public policy of the state
demanded that tortfeasors should not be immunized from the liabil-
ities that accrue to their actions.90
Finally, it is pointed out that the immunity rule belongs to a
social order that has ceased to exist for over a hundred years."
Spouses are simply not as dependent economically, socially, or le-
gally on each other as they were during prior times. One need only
examine the statistics showing increases in the number of married
women who are in the nation's work force to become aware of such
trends in all facets of American family life.2 Such practical and
tangible developments in our social order should not be ignored by
the courts.
86. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 386, 282 A.2d 351, 358 (1971) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
"So employed, the doctrine is not a concept for preserving domestic harmony, but becomes
instead a misdirected application for defeating a fair and just result."
87. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 594, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973).
88. Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 555, 180 A.2d 772, 776 (1962) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
"Negligence does not import enmity. Negligence is simply carelessness. It is not based on
premeditation which, on the contrary, is always charged in the deliberate breaking or breach-
ing of a contract."
89. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
90. Id. at 594, 305 A.2d at 882.
91. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 861 (4th ed. 1971).
92. See REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN: 1973. This
Commission was founded by Governor Milton J. Shapp of Pennsylvania in March of 1972.
The following information was provided by the Commission's First Annual Report which was
compiled under the direction of Ms. Arline Lotman, Executive Director.
Nationally, women comprise forty-three percent of the labor force and by 1980 are
expected to account for over half the American working population. In forty percent
of today's family units, both the husband and the wife work full time.
Id. at 1.
The decade of the sixties brought a considerable increase in the proportion of Pennsyl-
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
Over the course of the years, critics of the doctrine have developed
rationales for excepting certain actions from the immunity rule. One
exception is when the tort is committed intentionally.13 In these
cases, the policy considerations used to support the rule simply
break down. Death also removes the reason for the doctrine. 4 In
Pennsylvania, it has been held that the statutory and policy pros-
criptions are no longer present when an estate, rather than a living
person, is being sued. 5 Moreover, it has been held in some jurisdic-
tions that divorce results in exemption from the disability."
Finally, in Pennsylvania, joinder of the other spouse by the origi-
nal defendant on an indemnity theory does not invoke the doctrine
unless a sole verdict is rendered against the spouse. 7 Such an action
is not viewed as a suit by one spouse against the other, as any
liability would run to the original defendant, not the plaintiff-
spouse.98
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Numerous suggestions for modification or change of the immunity
doctrine have been advanced. One suggestion has been to allow such
suits if the tort is committed prior to coverture. This has found some
acceptance in other jurisdictions.9 This argument may be a crucial
vania women in the labor force as the number of women workers rose by 24 percent.
Id. at 2.
More than half (53 percent) of the women workers in Pennsylvania in 1970 were
married and living with their husbands. Of all married women, more than 935,000, or
36 percent, were in the labor force.
Id. at 3.
93. Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82, 84 (1972).
94. "A further exception permitted a surviving spouse to sue the estate of the deceased
stouse for a tort committed during his or her lifetime." Id. at 84.
95. Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
96. Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82, 84 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 493, 181 A. 792, 797 (1935).
98. Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1944).
Her husband is not a party defendant to the action so far as she is concerned. The
judgement against him, as restricted by the Court, is not enforceable by her, nor does
it enure to her benefit. It is simply a judgement enuring to the benefit of the original
defendant if he pays or is required to pay the wife's judgement; and it then requires
the husband to pay to the original defendant only one-half of the damages paid by the
latter as a result of the joint negligence of both.
Id. at 483-84, 40 A.2d at 917.
99. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Carver v. Ferguson, 115 Cal. App.
2d 641, 254 P.2d 44 (1953).
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factor when dealing with statutes that limit spouses to suits for their
separate property.'0 In fact, this argument may well be the decisive
factor in any future reversal of position in the Pennsylvania courts,
as Justice Roberts had argued in his DiGirolamo dissent.'0 ' Another
suggestion has been to remove the immunity, and leave the disposi-
tion of the matter to the applicability of that state's automobile
guest statute.'0 This would eliminate a substantial portion of the
interspousal suits,' 3 and would help curb fears of collusion that a
reluctant court may harbor.' 4
With the realities of insurance in mind, it has been suggested that
insurance contracts could be sold that contain a disclaimer clause
precluding such suits.'0 Hence, the spouses themselves would de-
cide whether they wished to pay extra premiums for increased
coverage. 06 Another interesting position recommends that a spouse
be permitted to sue the insurance company directly. Hence, the
defendant-company could call the spouse who was at fault as a
hostile witness and cross-examine him. The proceeding would be
basically collusion-free, and the parties would be truly adversary. '0
100. See, e.g., Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959).
101. DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 573-74, 312 A.2d 382, 390 (1973) (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
102. Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in American Tort
Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 320 (1967). "Since most cases involving interspousal torts
deal with automobile accidents, a spouse, despite the abrogation of the immunity rule, may
not be liable because the other spouse was a guest in his car."
103. See 27 OHIo ST. L. REv. 550, 555 (1966).
104. 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 590, 603 (1970). "The problem of collusion, for example, could
be somewhat resolved by the passage of an 'Automobile Guest Statute'."
105. Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in American Tort
Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. Rv. 307, 318 (1967). "Perhaps the most effective argument against
the collusion rationale is the possibility of excluding tort liability between spouses in insur-
ance contracts."
106. 19 DE PAUL L. Rev. 590, 603 (1970). "[A]nother alternative could be that the con-
tract of insurance contain limitations excluding a spouse, or other family members, from
coverage."
107. Ford, Interspousal Immunity for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law
and Reason versus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
It would, therefore, seem desirable to allow the injured spouse to sue the insurance
company directly, or at least to join it as a defendant in an action against the
defendant-spouse. The insurer's attorneys could then conduct their own defense, treat
the tortfeasor-spouse as a hostile witness, cross-examine him, make clear to the jury
any bias he may have, and eliminate any danger of collusion. The few states that have
permitted this procedure have apparently found the law of evidence adequate to deal




Finally, it has been recommended that each case be determined as
it arises. Policy, statutory and historic law would combine to either
preclude or permit litigation.' 8
CONCLUSIONS
The DiGirolamo decision, in its total reliance upon the statutes
in question, adhered to Pennsylvania's longstanding acceptance of
a traditional position in respect to the interspousal immunity
doctrine. Its analysis, however, which neither questioned the fic-
tional conceptualistic unity of spouses nor inquired into the policy
reasons underlying its existence, failed to take into account many
of the issues that are raised by a contemporary challenge to the
doctrine.
The rationales which have long supported the doctrine are begin-
ning to lose their acceptance. The fictional unity theory, and with
it the immunity doctrine, is now being frequently rejected. 0 The
underpinnings of the policy arguments that secured the rule are
slowly being eroded by changes in the social fabric of American
society. Novel arguments are being advanced by judges and com-
mentators to circumvent longstanding precedent upholding the
rule. Nevertheless, DiGirolamo would seem to indicate that change
in this doctrine in Pennsylvania must come from the legislature or
not at all.
DAvm SCHMITT
CRIMINAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SCOPE
OF SEARCH-The United States Supreme Court has held that a
search incident to a valid arrest for a traffic violation is not limited
108. 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 183 (1971).
Thus, when presented with an interspousal suit, a court must determine whether there
are factors present that warrant the imposition of the immunity doctrine. If no such
factors are found, one spouse can sue the other.
Id. at 186.
109. The number of states that have abolished the doctrine is rapidly approaching, if it
has not already passed, twenty-five. The following are some of the states that have limited
or abolished the rule:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin.
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